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     PAPER  2:   
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PREVENT 
STRATEGY WITHIN UK COUNTER TERRORISM 
AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 
MAKERS, COMMUNITIES AND LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
Dr Philip  Henry  
Director of the Multi-Faith Centre and Sociologist, 
University of Derby 
 
Abstract 
 
Prevent – the strategy – has become 
embedded in counter terrorism policy in 
the UK since 2007. It was reviewed and 
re-written in 2011 and has taken on 
even greater significance at the level of 
addressing questions of how to 
challenge and prevent ‘radicalisation’ in 
the context of managing security in the 
nation? This paper examines the 
tensions associated with the Prevent 
strategy and its legacy in the UK since 
2007. It will explore the juxtaposition of 
policy making, which on one hand sees 
the means-ends solutions of avoiding 
further instances of terrorism at all 
costs, set against a potential 
community-based and local authority 
engagement model that foregrounds 
safeguarding against radicalisation and 
extremism in all its forms as a priority  
 
 
when working with communities across 
the country. There are apparent 
tensions in the emphasis of 
implementation and deliver of this 
strategy, which continue to challenge 
perceptions against the growing 
strengthening of fears associated with 
the erosion of civil liberties. The paper 
argues for a significant change in 
awareness of the behaviours and 
attitudes associated with ‘radicalisation’ 
and suggests policy could better reflect 
practice as we move through the 
second decade of the century. 
 
Keywords: Prevent; terrorism; 
radicalisation; safeguarding; policy; 
identity; education.  
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Introduction 
‘Prevent’, as one area of four within the 
UK CONTEST counter-terrorism 
strategy (Home Office, 2003) 1  has 
been criticised, misconceived, 
misunderstood, often times 
communicated without clarity of 
purpose beyond the reading of the 
physical strategy document (Home 
Office, 2007, 2011) and open to a range 
of interpretations. Since 2007 it has 
been criticised by academics, the 
media and press, policy makers and 
members of civil society, not least by 
significant figures in Muslim 
communities (see House of Commons 
CLG Committee (2010) and Home 
Affairs Select Committee (2012) 
reports). Such criticism, ironically, has 
also been levelled at the first version of 
the Prevent Strategy (2007) (Prevent 1) 
by the former Home Secretary (and 
now Prime Minister) Theresa May in the 
Forward to Prevent 2 (2011) in which 
she states: 
                                                        
1 CONTEST includes four strategic elements: 
Pursue (Policing and state Intelligence Services 
MI5, MI6, with potential criminal justice 
outcomes), Prevent (counter terrorism options 
to stop or prevent individuals, being drawn into 
radicalisation/ extremism outside the criminal 
justice system), Protect (directed at 
infrastructure protection across the nation, 
includes transport, power,  borders - ports and 
airports, and contingencies in towns and cities 
The Prevent programme we 
inherited from the last 
Government was flawed. It 
confused the delivery of 
Government policy to promote 
integration with Government 
policy to prevent terrorism. It 
failed to confront the extremist 
ideology at the heart of the threat 
we face; and in trying to reach 
those at risk of radicalisation, 
funding sometimes even 
reached the very extremist 
organisations that Prevent 
should have been confronting.  
 
This paper seeks to bring the context, 
background and implementation of 
Prevent and the ever-shifting 
landscape of counter-terrorism in the 
UK into focus in 2016 2 . The current 
response academically has seen 
various iterations of academic attention 
since the pilot years of 2006 until 2014. 
In the last two years however, there has 
been less direct academic engagement 
with Prevent with a few exceptions: 
(O’Toole et al  2016; Quartermaine, 
2014; Saeed & Johnson, 2016; 
Thomas, 2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2016,). 
to reduce risks of terrorist attacks) and Prepare 
(in the event of terrorist incidents that cannot 
be stopped; mitigating potential harmful fallout, 
in cost to human life and minimise damage to 
infrastructure). 
2 The limitations of space in the production of 
this paper will result in an overview of the 
historic legacy of the Prevent Strategy, the detail 
of which can be seen in the articles cited, but 
only presented here in summary. 
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There is no logical explanation for fewer 
articles on the subject, suffice to think 
because of the rise of Islamic State it 
has shifted attention in many social 
science disciplines and it is still early in 
academic terms to see the results of 
recent manifestation from Syria and 
Iraq. The other issue of major 
significance (in counter-terrorism 
terms) that directly impacts on the 
Prevent Strategy, is the ‘Statutory Duty’ 
enacted in 2015, which does, like 
Islamic State, require our attention.  
 
The paper will argue that, in line with 
Cantle and Thomas (2015) and 
Thomas (2015, 2016) broader 
education in the classroom that 
involves non-stigmatising values led 
citizenship and anti-extremism 
educational projects through which 
teachers are empowered and have 
confidence to deliver difficult topic 
areas is not insurmountable, and is 
preferable in support of youth 
engagement with the Prevent strategy. 
However, unlike Thomas (2014, 2015, 
2016) and Ragazzi (2014) the author 
would like to suggest that the flaws of 
Prevent 1 (responsible for most of the 
critique of the strategy) are being put 
behind us at policy level and being 
recognised by the current government, 
who appear to be seeking a greater 
collaborative approach and potentially 
more meaningful partnership with 
Muslim communities and other 
stakeholders (see Middle East Eye 
[online] - Home Affairs Select 
Committee Report Aug, 2016) 
compared with early years 
manifestations. This may not however 
necessarily change some areas of 
public opinion, especially if rebranding 
not reconceptualising the strategy is the 
outcome?   
 
This study draws on a review of 
academic literature between 2006 and 
2016, spanning ten years from pilot 
programmes addressing the 
‘Prevention of Violent Extremism’ to 
date. The study works by summarising 
the impact and shift in policy and 
strategy in the UK in relation to Prevent 
1, and 2 and in the context of Islamic 
State’s emergence and its 
interpretation of religiously-inspired 
radical forms of Islam. It considers the 
impact of Islamic State on Prevent 2 in 
the UK. Within the review of academic 
studies are significant empirical works 
(Kundnani, 2009, 2012; Millings, 2013; 
Mythen, 2012; Pantazis & Pemberton, 
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2009; O’Toole et al 2013, 2016; 
Thomas, 2014) that help in 
consideration of how evidence at grass 
roots level connects with the thesis that 
academically, many authors are 
grounding their work in past flaws of 
early Prevent 1? It asks if too little 
attention is being given to the details of 
the shift towards widening 
professionalization post the 2015 
implementation of the duty on Prevent. 
This includes how best to grapple with 
problematic concepts like 
‘radicalisation’, both at the level of 
accumulating important knowledge that 
could impact on the safeguarding of 
individuals (under the duty) and at the 
level of dispelling myths that Muslim 
communities are both ‘risky and at risk’ 
(Heath-Kelly, 2013) in a prior 
homogenisation of collective religious 
and cultural identities which has 
occurred in unhelpful ways.  
 
Tensions, Academic and 
Societal? 
 
Broadly and in summary, the main 
critiques of Prevent between 2007 and 
its review by the former coalition 
government in 2010; what Thomas, 
(2014) calls Prevent 1, and its re-writing 
in 2011(Prevent 2), fall into four areas: 
1) An over emphasis on Muslim 
communities and individuals creating a 
‘suspect community’, including 
allegations of ‘spying’ or using Prevent 
as an intelligence gathering tool and/or 
form of discipline curtailing Muslim 
social and cultural capital (Birt, 2009; 
Heath-Kelly, 2013; Martin, 2014;  
Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009; 
Thomas, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2012, 
2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2016). Here the 
levels of scrutiny were described as 
disproportionate to the level of threat 
and ignoring other forms of extremism 
including a resurgent far-right; 2) 
specifically targeted funding for Muslim 
communities creating ‘resource envy’ 
(DCLG Committee, 2010) from other 
communities of minority and majority 
ethnicities; 3) much of the community 
development work within Muslim 
communities (between 2007-2010) 
appears to have been associated with 
Prevent 1 (counter-terrorism funding). 
Funding was provided to mainly 
conservative, or traditional Muslim 
leaders/groups which reinforced 
generational tensions and created 
divisions in communities; and 4) local 
authorities and the Department for 
Communities and Local Government 
(DCLG) responsible for the funding at 
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that time (2007-2010) appear to have 
conflated community cohesion on one 
hand with counter terrorism on the 
other3, which resulted in confusion both 
within and across Muslim communities, 
civil society broadly and within state 
agencies (police, local authorities and 
government departments). 
 
In 2011 the revised version of Prevent 
(Prevent 2) redefined both its content 
and the government department taking 
control of the agenda; now hosted by 
the Office for Security and Counter 
Terrorism (OSCT) within the Home 
Office. As a result there were some 
significant shifts in emphasis and 
Prevent 2 attempted to implement 
solutions to earlier criticism (outlined 
above). What followed was the 
adoption of many (if not all) of the 
recommendations of the coalition 
government’s 2011 review, which was 
based on evidence to earlier 
Parliamentary committees, which had 
examined the value and efficacy of 
Prevent between 2009 and 2011 and 
root causes for violent radicalisation 
between 2010 and 2012. 
                                                        
3 The conflation of these apparently opposed 
ideas (community cohesion and counter 
terrorism) will be discussed later in the paper. 
 
Criticism of Prevent 2 however shifted 
emphasis with that of the strategy. In 
other words, concerns about the 
securitisation and policy contradiction 
of the cohesion agenda (Ragazzi, 
2012, 2014; Thomas, 2012, 2014, 
2015. 2016) was shaped around a 
discourse that saw funds reduced for 
Prevent work and a tightening of access 
to resources, which had until that point 
been provided with little monitoring or 
accountability. In addition, Thomas 
(2016) claims the Prevent Statutory 
Duty in 2015 increased the 
securitisation threat through its 
unnecessary influence in the state 
education sector (Thomas, 2016), 
broadly impacting on Schools, Colleges 
and Higher Education Institutions 
(Thomas, 2015, 2016; Saeed & 
Johnson, 2016). References continued 
to ‘suspect communities’ under Prevent 
2, through a so-called essentialising 
approach to Muslims in the nation. This 
idea has its origins in Hillyard’s early 
thesis, (1993) and is reflected in 
Pantazis and Pemberton’s (2009) 
comparison of former Irish dissidents 
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being the ‘old suspects’, and Muslims 
under Prevent, being the ‘new 
suspects’ that replaced the Irish. In 
addition Heath-Kelly suggests that 
Muslims are seen as both ‘risky and at 
risk’ (2013). Greer’s (2010) rebuttal of 
the ‘suspect community thesis’ 
however, adds to a rich debate about 
how and to what extent is the empirical 
evidence both sufficient and specifically 
evidencing serious questions of 
generalising ‘Muslims as suspects’. He 
also critiques the idea of Muslim  
‘material discrimination’ – influencing 
extremism, and as a consequence, 
challenges the credibility of the idea 
that Muslims are the subject of 
wholesale ‘securitisation’. This raises a 
question we will address later - is the 
evidence sufficiently robust, is it 
representative, has it the validity in 
sample terms and what can we 
legitimately claim about responses from 
research populations?  
 
To add to the already vexed debates 
about securitisation of Muslim 
communities, in 2013/14 we saw the 
rise of Islamic State (IS) in Syria and 
Iraq. This was foreseen by security and 
intelligence services, but its impact 
domestically came much later. As 
Hewitt (2007) points out the security 
and intelligence services were playing 
catch up, as had been the case in the 
late 1990s when the emphasis moved 
from the IRA to international terrorism 
by the early 2000s. According to Hewitt 
that  ‘was no easy matter’ (2007:94), 
nor was the shift from Al Qa’eda (AQ) 
to IS in Iraq and the subsequent 
concern it created among security 
officials and government. The tensions 
in Iraq played out between Sunni and 
Shia militants under Abu Musab al 
Zarqawi (forming Islamic State in Iraq) 
from 2003, and affiliating with AQ in 
October 2004 (Stern and Berger, 2015) 
was a sign of things to come.  
 
In so far as translating the impact of IS 
to UK domestic life is concerned, 
specifically, challenging western liberal 
democratic values and importing 
transnational terror to UK shores, little 
was known at the level of policing about 
IS. Even less was known about its 
potential draw to many young people 
and families prepared to leave the UK 
to travel to Syria and/or Iraq. The 
reinforcing of a traditional historic 
model of Muslim civil society through 
the historic Caliphate, despite how it 
was set up and the implications of IS 
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taking violence to an extreme level, did 
not deter those who saw an opportunity 
they could not foresee, by staying at 
home. As a consequence the Prevent 2 
legislative upgrading of the Counter-
Terrorism and Security Act, 2015 (CTS 
- bringing about the Statutory Duty) was 
hastened along on the back of 
significant numbers travelling to Syria 
and Iraq between 2014-2016 - reported 
by the BBC as 850 travellers to date 
(BBC News database, 12th Aug, 2016). 
Of those approximately half have 
returned to the UK, while more than 200 
have died, been convicted or remain in 
Syria or Iraq. Known deaths are 
currently at 66, convictions 64 and 
believed to still be in Iraq or Syria 81. 
 
The ‘Digital Caliphate’ as it became 
known (Atwan, 2015) created a new 
and pervasive threat to national 
security under Prevent 2. The threat 
manifest in untold numbers of people 
having access to IS recruitment through 
social media platforms in everyday use, 
like for example: Facebook, Twitter, 
Instagram, and one-to-one digitally 
encrypted platforms like Whats App, 
Ask fm, kick it etc. The threat from IS 
and the Caliphate ideal created a 
significant shift in attention for Prevent 
Police Case Management (PCM) and 
Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU) officers, 
which for a time almost eclipsed 
concerns about AQ and continues to be 
the persistent threat according to the 
state. This additional complexity only 
added to even greater tensions in 
relation to civil liberties, as now the 
surveillance question on social media 
outlets, web-based services and one-
to-one messaging was firmly in the 
spotlight. 
 
What Does Prevent 2 ask us to 
consider? 
Prevent 2 in 2011 explicitly states in 
‘Guiding Principles; a Framework for 
Prevent’: that it addresses all forms of 
terrorism, prioritising against the 
greatest level of threat; it will not spy on 
or condone spying on anyone in 
community, stating:  
“Prevent must not be used as a 
means for covert spying on 
people or communities. Trust in 
Prevent must be improved” 
(Prevent, 20116 [3.15]). 
  
It will not fund extremists; it will protect 
freedoms of speech, but requires 
appropriate challenge to extremists 
(including non-violent extremists), and 
on the question of integration has this 
to say: 
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Prevent depends on a 
successful integration strategy. 
But integration alone will not 
meet Prevent objectives. And 
Prevent must not assume 
control of or allocate funding to 
integration projects, which have 
a value far wider than security 
and counter-terrorism: the 
Government will not securitise 
its integration strategy. This has 
been a mistake in the past 
(Prevent, 2011:6 [3.14]). 
 
Prevent 2 objectives state:  
Within this overall framework the 
new Prevent strategy will 
specifically: [1] respond to the 
ideological challenge of 
terrorism and the threat we face 
from those who promote it; [2] 
prevent people from being 
drawn into terrorism and 
ensure that they are given 
appropriate advice and support; 
and [3] work with sectors and 
institutions where there are 
risks of radicalisation which we 
need to address. 
 
On the face of things and based on the 
explicit response addressed above to 
previous criticism, Prevent 2 would 
appear to be making good (in large part 
and on paper) its previous misgivings, 
which are challenged and criticised by 
a number of academics cited in this 
paper (see list above). This making 
good does not however exonerate 
overzealous policing or the 
inappropriate use of power or influence 
in addressing the objectives or guiding 
principles. The strategy as written is 
extant and has not been altered since 
2011. In addition to the previous 
Prevent 1 version, Prevent 2 makes 
three fundamental changes in face of its 
critics: 1) It explicitly draws a line in the 
sand on secrecy, stating it will only work 
to intervene or offer advice and support 
overtly, transparently and with the 
knowledge and consent of the 
individual’s it works with; 2) It will only 
work in the non-criminal space, that is, 
in order to prevent criminalisation 
though the criminal justice system 
(CJS). For this to work individuals must 
cooperate by agreeing to work with 
either formal or informal intervention 
providers (subject to the Channel multi-
agency referral process, or informally 
outside it). Prevent will, through 
counselling and other support seek to 
work with individuals to keep them out 
of the CJS; and 3) emphasises local 
authority Prevent co-ordinators (many 
of whom are taking a lead) and multi-
agency function, both in relation to 
Channel referrals and local level 
community engagement.   
 
Prevent’s 2007-2010 legacy however, 
seems to carry the weight of academic 
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and other research participants critical 
opinions beyond the early period and to 
date. This raises the question, how 
widespread are these reported early 
misgivings in relation to the strategy 
and its implementation and are they 
being substantiated by the later Prevent 
2 version of the strategy? Prevent 2, as 
presented above, has documented its 
intention to change, learning from the 
previous mistakes. We will come back 
to this question and the representation 
issue that flows from it later, but first let 
us consider the one substantive change 
to Prevent 2 - the implementation of the 
Prevent Statutory Duty in 2015. 
 
There are significant changes brought 
about in the move that saw Prevent 
take on a statutory function relative to 
the implementation of the Statutory 
Duty for Prevent under new legislation 
(The Counter-Terrorism and Security 
Act, 2015). Prevent Duty Guidance 
(2015) states:  
Our Prevent work is intended to 
deal with all kinds of terrorist 
threats to the UK. The most 
significant of these threats is 
currently from terrorist 
organisations in Syria and Iraq, 
and Al Qa’ida associated 
groups. But terrorists associated 
with the extreme right also pose 
a continued threat to our safety 
and security (Prevent Duty 
Guidance, 2015:6). 
 
 
The guidance under the new duty sets 
out where the threats are likely to come 
from and takes a ‘risk-based approach’ 
in addressing the sector specific 
requirements for the ‘specified 
authorities’, which includes: Local 
Authorities, Police, Prisons and 
Probation, Schools, Further and Higher 
Education and Health. There are seven 
broad areas covered by the duty, which 
include, 1) Leadership, 2) productive 
cooperation, 3) staff understanding 
radicalisation and training in relation to 
risk/vulnerability, referral (into Channel 
or other programmes), 4) differentiating 
extremism from terrorism, 5) obtaining 
support, knowledge of challenge, 6) 
ICT safety and 7) monitoring and 
inspection, described as follows: 
[Under the heading of 
‘leadership’] establish or use 
existing mechanisms for 
understanding the risk of 
radicalisation; ensure staff 
understand the risk and build the 
capabilities to deal with it; 
communicate and promote the 
importance of the duty; and 
ensure staff implement the duty 
effectively. 
 
Demonstrate evidence of 
productive co-operation, in 
particular with local Prevent co-
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ordinators, the police and local 
authorities, and co-ordination 
through existing multi-agency 
forums, for example Community 
Safety Partnerships. 
 
Frontline staff who engage with 
the public should understand 
what radicalisation means and 
why people may be vulnerable to 
being drawn into terrorism as a 
consequence of it. They need to 
be aware of what we mean by 
the term “extremism” and the 
relationship between extremism 
and terrorism. 
 
Staff need to know what 
measures are available to 
prevent people from becoming 
drawn into terrorism and how to 
challenge the extremist ideology 
that can be associated with it. 
They need to understand how to 
obtain support for people who 
may be being exploited by 
radicalising influences. 
 
All specified authorities subject 
to the duty will need to ensure 
they provide appropriate training 
for staff involved in the 
implementation of this duty. 
Such training is now widely 
available (Prevent Duty 
Guidance, 2015: 6-8) 
 
Additionally, statutory workers need to 
know about Information sharing 
protocols monitoring and inspection by 
a sector specific inspector, for example, 
OFSTED in schools-based education, 
or HEFCE in the higher education 
sector. 
 
In principle much of what is required for 
compliance under the ‘duty’ appears to 
build on existing mechanisms within 
sectors, but assumes some prior 
knowledge, which is not always present 
in relation to Prevent more broadly. The 
need to risk assess and action plan and 
create some sense of partnership 
working (productive cooperation) with 
local Prevent coordinators (steering 
groups) or local authority equivalents in 
Community Safety, should not be too 
onerous a demand against existing 
safeguarding risk assessments. 
However, there are some ‘specified 
authorities’ under the ‘duty’, for 
example, schools, where an implicit 
response by the Department for 
Education (DfE 2015a, 2015b, 2015c) 
includes advice/guidance on 
safeguarding and Prevent and how to 
connect British Values with the 
Spiritual, Moral, Social and Cultural 
Development of children and young 
people (SMSC). In so doing 
foregrounding SMSC defined by British 
values against the definition of 
extremism in the statutory duty (and in 
Prevent 2). 
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The definition of extremism is defined 
as: 
vocal or active opposition to 
fundamental British values, 
including democracy, the rule of 
law, individual liberty and mutual 
respect and tolerance of 
different faiths and beliefs. 
Including calls for the death of 
members of the armed forces at 
home or overseas (Counter-
Terrorism & Security Act, 2015). 
 
The definition is too vague, requires a 
largely subjective test, and presents an 
unacceptable conclusion – that active 
or vocal opposition to democracy, rules 
of law, individual liberty or tolerance 
etc., equals extremism? This removes 
any context or consequence for exactly 
what constitutes vocal or active 
opposition, and in that sense appears 
unhelpfully arbitrary. In practical terms, 
it is unworkable for educationalists that 
cannot be expected to make 
judgements based on the definition 
above, and it will undoubtedly receive 
legal challenge at some future point in 
time.  
 
However, in so far as developing 
experiential learning experiences 
around democracy, rules, individual 
liberty and mutual respect and 
tolerance of different faiths and beliefs 
is concerned, and setting aside the 
extremism question for a moment, this 
definition does inculcate democratic 
and cohesive elements within it, given 
its universal potential to be applied to 
all. From the perspective of a fourfold 
model around which to develop SMSC 
this would, under any other 
circumstances provide a useful starting 
point for teachers in thinking about the 
background to citizenship teaching and 
learning experiences, using the 
principles of spiritual, moral, social and 
cultural development. The author would 
like to suggest in principle, that it could 
also form the basis for some of the 
more difficult and necessary debates 
that need to take place among 
educators and pupils in relation to 
radicalisation, its causes and concerns 
for all in schools and communities.  
 
There are however other issues 
reflected in what the Prevent Duty 
requires of professionals in ‘specified 
authorities’ including schools. From the 
perspective of managing risk, 
identifying best practice and under the 
duty of care to those under eighteen 
years in school, it presents a 
safeguarding dilemma. If the inference 
is that to make a decision about a pupils 
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physical and/or psychological well 
being is premised on ‘who is in vocal or 
active opposition to fundamental British 
Values’ – vis-à-vis the four elements of 
the definition above, is this something 
that teachers (including their 
designated safeguarding leads) can 
make a call on? Do they have the 
knowledge, skills and judgement to 
address these, now safeguarding 
aspects under the duty, relating to 
questions of radicalisation/extremism 
or moving into or out of terrorism? 
Having delivered a bespoke form of 
Prevent training to more than 1000 
teachers in Derby and Derbyshire 
schools in the last three years, the 
author would say not. 
 
Thomas (2016) raises very important 
issues in relation to education and the 
need for a wider level of open 
citizenship-based engagement with 
what he describes as ‘anti-extremism 
education’, using a human rights-based 
model in which more open debates 
without fear of sanction can take place. 
He states:  
 
Only through such citizenship 
education, with a human rights 
framework at its core, will young 
people be equipped with the 
individual and peer group 
resilience to examine and reject 
ideologies that promote hatred 
and violence (Thomas, 
2016:184).  
 
The author supports this idea, together 
with wider teacher training. Thomas 
(2014) also criticises Prevent 1, for 
attempting then failing to address the 
needs in education. It should be 
recognised that the statutory duty has 
changed the landscape irrevocably 
(subject to Parliamentary intervention), 
and the call for safeguarding training to 
be delivered with a national footprint put 
out by the Department For Education in 
the summer of 2016, is an indication (a 
year on from the advent of the Statutory 
Duty) of the lack of planning and 
foresight, by government to manage 
the teacher training aspects. Too few 
teachers have the knowledge, or 
confidence to develop open debates 
and ‘anti-extremism education’ and we 
should acknowledge (in line with 
Thomas, 2016) that by not learning the 
lessons of previous ‘white racist’ issues 
in our schools, allowed them to be 
driven underground. It would equally be 
an error not to correct the lack of 
educational engagement with the 
difficulties presented by extremism 
regardless of how unpalatable such 
ICDIR 2016 – International Conference on Diplomacy & International Relations    
 
 
52 
derby.ac.uk/lhss 
views might be (Phillips, Tse & 
Johnson, 2011). 
 
Implications for Policy Makers 
Communities and Law 
Enforcement 
 
The criticisms and questions raised by 
many academics, some policy makers, 
law enforcement and members of the 
public reflects the on going discussion 
about the efficacy and practicality of a 
forward thinking counter-terrorism 
policy framework in which Prevent, as 
pointed out by Pantucci  (when talking 
about counter-terrorism strategies) 
raises the security versus civil liberties 
question, stating: 
 
Unlike dictatorships or other 
authoritarian regimes, 
democracies are inherently fluid 
and must be responsive to their 
public’s demands, meaning that 
the parameters of the debate on 
where we draw the line between 
civil liberties and public 
protection is also likely to be a 
fluid one (Pantucci, 2010: 265). 
 
Critiques of the operationalisation of 
Prevent 2, as opposed to its policy 
position on paper, appear to be raising 
further questions, many of which are 
addressed in the literature covered in 
this paper, but often not 
incontrovertibly. For those who suggest 
Prevent is unworkable and needs a 
strategy change as the only solution, 
what does the alternative look like? Is 
then Prevent 2 a bridge too far for post-
industrial UK liberal democracy or has 
it been misconceived, confused with 
Pursue (in counter-terrorism terms) and 
associated with legislative tightening of 
government policy to impact terrorist 
threats (in the criminal justice context) 
to its detriment?  
 
The only substantial material change to 
Prevent 2, cannot be played down and 
the implications of the enactment of the 
duty under the Counter-Terrorism and 
Security Act 2015 (CTS) will continue to 
raise debate about it’s implementation, 
and as discussed above specifically, in 
how it impacts on education. There are 
similar conversations to be had about 
the duty’s impact on the other ‘specified 
authorities’ - health, local authorities, 
prisons and the police themselves. 
Prevent 2 has seen no updating or 
rewriting since 2011. In reviewing the 
critique presented earlier in relation to 
Prevent, the Prevent 2 Guiding 
Framework apparently addresses 
these criticisms directly, e.g. 
securitisation, spying and cohesion 
(described as integration).  The 
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strategy’s claims are however disputed 
by Cantle and Thomas (2015), 
Cockburn (2007), Davies (2008), 
Kundnani (2009) and Thomas, (2012, 
2014, 2015, 2016). This raises other 
important policy related questions - is 
Prevent driving community cohesion 
out of local authority agendas (Cantle 
and Thomas, 2015; Thomas, 2012, 
2014, 2015, 2016), or has that idea 
been arrested and reverted in the 
current landscape? Thomas (2016) 
suggests multiculturalism is alive and 
well and cohesion is a new form of 
multiculturalism and not its death. If that 
is the case, given the current 
community development agenda at 
local authority level it would appear to 
embrace social cohesion, regardless of 
central government’s steer on this. 
 
The author also contends that the 
impacts on multi-culturalism of Prevent 
2, are today, less of a ‘policed 
multiculturalism’ (Ragazzi, 2014) on the 
basis that Police Prevent Case 
Management (PCM) within regional 
Counter Terrorism Units (CTUs) has 
seen significant tightening of budgets 
and refocusing of strategy. In many 
cases officers have been removed 
almost completely from educative 
awareness raising (East Midlands 
Regional PCM), and even supporting 
Home Office core deliverables - WRAP 
3 (Workshop for Raising Awareness of 
Prevent). This seeming withdrawal is 
mainly associated with a shift in 
emphasis from Chief Police Officers 
Council due to the Islamic State risk 
and threat that has seen PCM 
resources increasingly used for 
collating and assessing Channel 
referrals (within a multi-agency context) 
and/or for disruption purposes.  
 
While being far from a perfect solution 
Prevent 2, may, as Thomas (2014) 
suggests be seeing an ‘end in sight’ 
finding a new trajectory in 2016, with 
calls for a review in Parliament (as yet 
unpublished Home Affairs Select 
Committee report, Aug 2016) stopping 
short of removing the statutory duty, but 
taking account of a wider 
professionalization and subsequent 
rationalisation of the earlier debates, 
flaws and problems. The emphasis 
would be to focus on a broader public 
need to understand ‘radicalisation’ 
despite its academic ambivalence and 
training and counselling in more 
targeted ways being a possibility 
(Middle East Eye [online] Aug, 2016).  
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The evidence of a necessity to better 
train professionals can be seen in the 
potential impacts of the Prevent Duty on 
Local Authorities, Health, Education, 
the Police, Prisons and Probation 
Services. The Multi-Faith Centre at the 
University of Derby led a bespoke multi-
agency training programme in the East 
Midlands for the last three years, called 
‘Bringing Prevent to the Public Space’. 
The Centre worked with frontline staff 
across the sectors described above. 
That training reveals evidence from 
participants of professional needs to 
better understand the concepts 
associated with terrorism in all its forms 
and specifically far right extremism (a 
feature in the locality); to examine 
pathways towards terrorism, which is 
reflected in the lingua franca of 
‘radicalisation’ and to better understand 
the mundane nature of everyday 
experience that influences individuals. 
Peter Neumann (2012 [online]) 
describes “the three common 
denominators that we know about 
[describing] how people radicalise 
[using] – grievances, ideology and 
mobilisation” and where each is 
influenced and influences the other. To 
deal with these influences requires a 
situational response from 
professionals; a response that by 
necessity, requires a deeper 
knowledge than can be provided by 
WRAP 3 training. Many of these 
professionals will be expected to 
support individuals and they may be 
called upon to make decisions based 
on their knowledge of safeguarding 
against radicalisation.  In addition the 
community and voluntary sector are 
also raising questions about the 
significance of cohesion and how it fits 
with the implementation of Prevent?  
 
These everyday and often mundane 
aspects of life create and shape our 
thinking, development and 
connectivity/interaction, with those to 
whom we feel we belong at a personal 
and collective level and with those we 
oppose and many layers of 
acceptance, tolerance and indifference 
along life’s journey. They include 
racism/discrimination, ideologies of 
politics/ religion and belief, secularising 
society, disillusionment, disassociation, 
disadvantage, exclusion, 
belongingness identity and the vexed 
topic of radicalisation.   
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The idea of radicalisation is often 
challenged (Thomas, 2014, 2015, 
2016). It may be seen as muddying the 
water between understanding terrorism 
and the pathways leading to and from 
terrorism. The topic of radicalisation is 
not made any easier as terrorism itself 
has over one hundred definitions and 
remains one of the most contested 
topics in the study of political violence. 
However, if you seek to remove 
radicalisation conceptually form the 
language that describes the process 
over time   (short or long) the author can 
only describe that which does not 
clearly breach the Terrorism legislation 
as ‘non-terrorism’. This appears 
unhelpful if you are trying to make 
sense of any pre-emptive preventative 
model to avoid the ‘non-terrorist’ 
becoming the terrorist. As a complex 
process radicalisation is just as likely to 
be manifest in everyday conversation 
with your friend in the gym, as it is 
through social media, hate preachers or 
speakers on You Tube and elsewhere. 
Radicalisation assumes and can 
consume those who see 
grievance/injustice, ideology and a way 
to mobilise (Neumann, 2012) how they 
feel. Unfortunately, like the baking of a 
cake, unless you have made one 
before you may be unaware (as are the 
state it seems) of what order the 
ingredients are mixed in, and whether 
the outcome is a so-called ‘radicalised 
individual’, as there are no parameters 
outside the legal tests by which to make 
the judgement. Radicalisation in the UK 
and Europe is associated with norms 
and values, and is subject specific, 
socially charged and difficult to 
articulate. It is often framed in Europe 
as the “rejection of key dimensions of 
modern democratic culture that are at 
the centre of the European value 
system” (Rabasa and Benard, 2015:3). 
This definition is not far from the UK 
version in Prevent 2, and associated 
ideas of democracy, rules, liberty and 
tolerance. 
 
Conclusion 
The paper has examined the critical 
contemporary conversation, which 
frames civil liberties against the 
background of national security. More 
questions than answers are ever likely 
to be the case in exploring an emotive 
and sensitive area like the 
implementation of a counter-terrorism 
strategy that has no parallel or 
equivalent, and has only been in place 
for ten years (including the pilot phase). 
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It was developed as the risk and threat 
unfolded and there is no denying it is 
fraught with mistakes, many of which 
however were identified in the early 
period of Prevent 1. Unfortunately, in 
the context of accuracy and on the face 
of the academic evidence examined 
here, authors of that literature are still 
citing the issues from the period 2007-
2011 as emblematic of Prevent 2, 
(2011-to date). Is there a reason for 
this? Perhaps media stories, and the 
mainly Muslim public’s concerns of the 
earlier period (well documented by 
academics and Parliamentary 
Committees and Reviews) continue to 
reinforce Prevent in the public 
perception as ‘a tainted brand’ as 
Thomas (2014) suggests?  
 
It seems Prevent 2 is unlikely to be 
treated any differently to Prevent 1 by 
its critics, even though there appears to 
be limited evidence, outside of the 
qualitative studies of relatively small 
numbers of participants reinforcing 
some of the specific community 
concerns. The media impact however 
cannot be underestimated and 
changing perceptions of a tainted brand 
is not easy to do. The impact of Prevent 
on individuals is likely to be based on 
the way people feel as a consequence 
of perceptions created by a number 
influencing factors, including collective 
memory. It could be argued that based 
on wider perceptions of Prevent as 
securitised by the state, and the 
influence of negative messaging that it 
is unlikely to change the way people 
appear to feel about it, particularly in 
Muslim communities. That is not to say 
that the criticisms of Prevent are 
unfounded, rather the opposite is likely 
to be the case, given the weight of 
potential evidence. However it would 
certainly help in assessing Prevent 
today, for a wider study to assist with 
quantifying and qualifying the critique 
and concerns by bringing together the 
literature with a national survey of 
communities and professionals in a 
wider study of public opinion.  
 
The significance of such a study has 
only one precedent, in a weighted 
random sample study of Muslim public 
opinion, commissioned by Channel 4 
for a documentary “What British 
Muslims Really Think?” in April 2016, 
(presented by Trevor Phillips - former 
Equality and Human Rights 
Commission chair). The programme 
was seen as controversial by some 
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(see Plunkett in The Guardian, 21st 
April 2016) but not by others 
(Dellingpole, The Spectator, 14th April 
2016). The programme was premised 
on a survey that reflects as close a form 
of Muslim representation as any recent 
study has been able to undertake, and 
has more detail than many others (ICM, 
[online] 2015). ICM Unlimited carried 
out the survey face-to-face, using 
Muslim researchers, polling during two 
periods in 2015. The results were more 
about integration than being security 
specific, but implicitly provided a more 
contented position for those British 
Muslims surveyed than much of the 
academic literature reviewed here 
attests too (see ‘What British Muslims 
Really Think’ Channel 4, 10pm 
Wednesday 13th April 2016 and ICM 
Unlimited [online] ‘C4/Juniper Survey of 
Muslims’ 2015). Methodologically the 
survey focused on a sampling frame 
that adopted areas where 20% of the 
population were Muslim and sought a 
representative random sample of 1008 
participants, described thus: 
  
ICM[s] analysis shows that there 
are 2,014 LSOAs [Lower Super 
Output Areas 4 ] with a 
                                                        
4 Lower Super Output Areas are geographical 
areas covering between 400 and 1,200 
households. 
penetration of at least 20% 
Muslim residents, and that these 
areas cover c.1.4 million 
Muslims – or 51% of Britain’s 
Muslim population. 
 
Results can be seen in greater detail at 
ICM Unlimited [online]. The headlines 
however, reflected in The Guardian, 
(Perraudin, 2016 [online]) suggest 
British Muslims are more likely to feel a 
stronger connection to Britain than the 
population at large (86% said this); and 
91% who took part said they felt a 
strong sense of belonging in their local 
area; additionally 88% of those 
surveyed said Britain was a good place 
for Muslims to live. On this basis the call 
for a more detailed community-focused 
attitudinal survey that addresses 
integration, security (including Prevent) 
and discrimination should be a future 
aspiration for amore nuanced 
understanding of who is speaking for 
who, when it comes to reporting Muslim 
opinions. 
 
We should ask ourselves, is Prevent 
today (in 2016), different to how it was 
conceived and delivered in its early 
years (2007-2011), and what a 
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democratic society might expect of 
governance at the political and 
executive levels given the context of the 
current global position and the UK’s 
relationship to transnational and 
domestic terrorism, including domestic 
aggressive forms of nationalism (and 
occasional violence) that play out in far-
right rhetoric? Should a policy that sits 
as one part of a four part counter-
terrorism strategy address, or seek to 
address, the overlapping and 
intertwined societal issues associated 
with and inclusive of many everyday 
aspects of life, that impact on the life 
choices of individuals (outlined above), 
or are there better ideas out there?  
 
We should not however shy away from 
the challenge to accurately assess 
public and professional feeling, beyond 
where we are currently and we should 
certainly find more opportunities for 
open debate in formal and informal 
education for both children/young 
people and adults, in what Thomas and 
Cantle (2015) and Thomas (2015, 
2016) refer to as “non-stigmatising 
values led citizenship and anti-
extremism educational projects”. 
 
There are a number of areas that 
should be examined in more depth in 
future papers, not least - impacts in 
Health, Education - including the FE 
and HE sectors, and what position do 
Local Authorities currently find 
themselves in, when considering the 
tension between Prevent and local 
community cohesion. Where too are 
the Police in this conversation and what 
are they planning in the context of 
managing Prevent 2; are they about to 
withdraw or reduce their involvement or 
increase their response?  Finally, how 
do Muslims in 2016 feel about Prevent, 
what personal experiences do they 
have of the strategy or wider counter-
terrorism policy, how do they know what 
they know about Prevent, and what 
influences their thinking about it? 
 
By assessing in detail these specific 
areas where Prevent is currently 
functioning we may draw closer to a 
policy implementation that might more 
closely resemble the realities on the 
ground. Research can seek to influence 
government to better understand that 
set of realities and consider how policy 
can better shape life for future 
generations, where openness and 
difficult discussions in all forms of 
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educative experience (formal, informal 
and public) are the norm. 
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